Cruelty, dowry harassment and dowry death cases under the BNS

Section 85 of the BNS (formerly Section 498A of the IPC) punishes the husband or a relative of the husband who subjects a woman to cruelty, with imprisonment up to three years and fine. Section 86 defines cruelty in two parts. The first is wilful conduct likely to drive the woman to suicide or to cause grave injury or danger to her life, limb or health, mental or physical. The second is harassment to coerce her or her relatives to meet an unlawful demand for property or valuable security, or harassment because such a demand was not met.

The first part does not need a dowry demand. The second part does. In Digambar v. State of Maharashtra (2024) the Supreme Court found no allegation meeting the second part, found the cruelty allegations vague with no specific instance, and quashed the case against the in-laws.

Section 80 of the BNS (formerly Section 304B of the IPC) applies where a woman dies by burns or bodily injury, or otherwise than under normal circumstances, within seven years of marriage, and it is shown that soon before her death she was subjected to cruelty or harassment by her husband or his relative for, or in connection with, any demand for dowry. The husband or relative is then deemed to have caused her death. The punishment is imprisonment of not less than seven years, which may extend to life. Dowry has the meaning given in Section 2 of the Dowry Prohibition Act, 1961.

In Shoor Singh v. State of Uttarakhand (2024) the Supreme Court explained that once these ingredients are proved beyond reasonable doubt, the presumption under Section 113B of the Evidence Act (now Section 118 of the Bharatiya Sakshya Adhiniyam, 2023) arises that the accused caused the dowry death. The burden of proving the ingredients, including the link to a dowry demand, stays on the prosecution. On the facts, the Court found that the demand related to celebrating the birth of a child and not to the marriage.

Section 3 of the Dowry Prohibition Act, 1961 punishes giving, taking or abetting dowry with imprisonment of not less than five years and fine of not less than fifteen thousand rupees or the value of the dowry, whichever is more. Section 4 punishes demanding dowry, directly or indirectly, with imprisonment of six months to two years and fine up to ten thousand rupees.

The Protection of Women from Domestic Violence Act, 2005 provides for protection, residence, monetary and custody orders. Breach of a protection order is an offence under Section 31, punishable with imprisonment up to one year, fine up to twenty thousand rupees, or both, and the Magistrate may also frame charges under Section 498A or the Dowry Prohibition Act where the facts disclose them. In Shaurabh Kumar Tripathi v. Vidhi Rawal (2025) the Supreme Court said that High Courts should be slow to quash proceedings under Section 12 of that Act, because a respondent there cannot be sentenced to imprisonment or fine as in a criminal trial.

In Arnesh Kumar v. State of Bihar (2014) the Supreme Court directed that police officers should not arrest automatically when a Section 498A case is registered. They must satisfy themselves that arrest is necessary under Section 41 of the CrPC, fill a checklist, and give the Magistrate their reasons, and the Magistrate must record his own satisfaction before authorising detention. A notice of appearance under Section 41A of the CrPC (now Section 35 of the BNSS) is to be served within two weeks of the case being instituted.

In Rajesh Sharma v. State of U.P. (2017) the Court had directed that complaints be referred to Family Welfare Committees. In Social Action Forum for Manav Adhikar (2018) a three-Judge Bench held the directions on constituting such committees and giving them power to be erroneous, while upholding directions on Red Corner Notices, clubbing of cases and the rule that recovery of disputed dowry items alone is no ground to refuse bail. In Shivangi Bansal v. Sahib Bansal (2025) the Court then directed that the Allahabad High Court's 2022 guidelines on Family Welfare Committees for Section 498A cases remain in effect and be implemented.

The Supreme Court has repeatedly quashed cases against relatives named without specific allegations. In Kahkashan Kausar v. State of Bihar (2022) it held that general and omnibus allegations against in-laws do not warrant prosecution. In Dara Lakshmi Narayana v. State of Telangana (2024), a case from a couple living in Jollarpeta in Tamil Nadu, the Court said that naming family members without specific allegations of active involvement should be nipped in the bud. The same judgment also said that a woman who has suffered cruelty should not stay silent or forbear from complaining.

Where the parties settle, Gian Singh v. State of Punjab (2012) recognised that offences arising out of matrimony relating to dowry, and family disputes where the wrong is basically private, may be quashed by the High Court under its inherent power, now Section 528 of the BNSS (formerly Section 482 of the CrPC), if the chance of conviction is remote. The court must still have regard to the nature and gravity of the offence, and the judgment excludes heinous offences such as murder and rape.