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Supreme Court judgments (daily digest)

Thursday, 19 November 2026 · No. 2026-11-19

Constitution of India (2)

D-0082 · 18.11.2026 · Art. 226

In Re: Phalodi Accident v. National Highways Authority of India, SMW(C) No.-000009-000009 - 2025

Court clarifies highway encroachment directions do not authorise demolition without statutory procedure

Editorial illustration on Constitution of India. Court says highway removal order alone cannot authorise demolition without statutory notice and hearing.

Facts that mattered

  • The suo motu proceedings arose from road accidents at Phalodi, Rajasthan, and the Court issued directions on 13.04.2026 requiring removal of unauthorised encroachments from National Highway Right of Way.
  • NHAI initiated demolition action against structures alleged to be encroachments, and numerous applicants claimed ownership of privately held land adjoining National Highways.
  • Applicants disputed NHAI's demarcation of the Right of Way and contended the directions did not authorise demolition without following the statutory procedure under the 2002 Act.
  • The Court had earlier granted interim protection and status quo in several matters pending resolution of these applications.

Legal concepts

  • A general direction to remove encroachments is not a conclusive adjudication that a particular structure is an unauthorised encroachment, and cannot dispense with the statutory determination required under law.

    Laid down · para 15

  • Section 26 of the Control of National Highways (Land and Traffic) Act, 2002 prescribes the essential procedure of notice, representation and consideration of cause shown, required for compliance with natural justice before removal of unauthorised occupation.

    Reaffirmed · para 16 · Gyan Prakash v. Union of India and Others, 2025 SCC OnLine SC 1189, para 16

  • Individual disputes over ownership, boundaries and Right of Way demarcation arising from highway encroachment removal are to be adjudicated by the jurisdictional High Courts rather than in suo motu Supreme Court proceedings directed at systemic road safety issues.

    Laid down · para 18

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D-0077 · 18.11.2026 · Art. 226

Prithviraj S. Singh (deceased) Through Lrs Etc. v. the Secretary, School Education Department, State of Maharashtra, C.A. No.-010193-010194 - 2016

Bench: HON'BLE MR. JUSTICE DIPANKAR DATTA, HON'BLE MR. JUSTICE SHEEL NAGU (2 judges). Judgment by HON'BLE MR. JUSTICE DIPANKAR DATTA

Court awards Rs 10 lakh compensation for termination contrary to a High Court consent order

Editorial illustration on Constitution of India. Court awards Rs 10 lakh for removal contrary to a High Court consent order.

Facts that mattered

  • The appellants, a senior clerk and a head clerk, faced departmental proceedings for misappropriation of public money in a private school.
  • They objected to inquiry committee members, then abstained from the inquiry, which proceeded ex parte, and they were removed from service without being furnished the inquiry reports.
  • The School Tribunal dismissed their appeals; their writ petitions before the High Court rested only on parity with the headmaster and did not plead violation of the consent order.
  • The High Court dismissed the writ petitions, holding the headmaster and the appellants did not stand on the same footing.

Legal concepts

  • A party must plead its case with the averments needed for the relief claimed, and a court is under no obligation to entertain a plea unsupported by such averments in the petition.

    Reaffirmed · para 9

  • An action or order wholly contrary to an express judicial order passed in exercise of competent jurisdiction is a nullity and cannot be accepted.

    Reaffirmed · para 11 · Ram Saran Varshney v. State of U.P., (2016) 3 SCC 724, para 11

  • A High Court cannot grant relief under Article 226 to a litigant who has approached it without pleading an appropriate case for relief.

    Reaffirmed · para 11

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Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 (2)

D-0080 · 18.11.2026 · O. 7 r. 11

Ashok Kumar v. Central Bank of India, C.A. No.-014308-014308 - 2026

Bench: HON'BLE MR. JUSTICE DIPANKAR DATTA, HON'BLE MR. JUSTICE SHEEL NAGU (2 judges). Judgment by HON'BLE MR. JUSTICE DIPANKAR DATTA

Court allows Rs.5 lakh to employee, holding interest claim was a separate subsequent cause of action

Editorial illustration on Code of Civil Procedure, 1908. Interest on delayed salary is a later claim, so it is not barred by the earlier final order.

Facts that mattered

  • Kumar, a bank employee, was acquitted in 1983 of defalcation charges; the acquittal attained finality in 1991 when the High Court dismissed appeals against it.
  • The High Court quashed the departmental enquiry in 2007 and ordered reinstatement with consequential benefits; that order attained finality when the Bank's SLP was dismissed in 2011.
  • Kumar was paid over Rs.42 lakh in 2011 but later sought 18% interest on delayed salary, first by a fresh writ petition dismissed in 2023, then by a miscellaneous application in the earlier writ petition filed in 2024.
  • The Single Judge and Division Bench dismissed the miscellaneous application, holding it barred by constructive res judicata and finality of the 2007 order.

Legal concepts

  • A miscellaneous application in a finally decided writ petition is not an independent proceeding; it has a narrow scope, is procedural not substantive, and cannot be used to agitate a subsequent or independent cause of action.

    Laid down · para 21

  • Res judicata and the bar of Order II Rule 2 CPC apply only to a claim that could have been raised when the earlier proceeding was instituted, and a claim based on a subsequent cause of action cannot be barred by a judgment on a prior cause of action.

    Laid down · para 20

  • Interest is a restitution for delay pendente lite and during appeals, a distinct cause of action arising subsequently, and it is not a penalty but a normal accretion on capital.

    Reaffirmed · para 23 · Alok Shanker Pandey v. Union of India, (2007) 3 SCC 545, para 23

  • The technical plea of constructive res judicata should not stand in the way of a litigant where relief is otherwise due, in view of the rule that an act of court should harm no litigant.

    Reaffirmed · para 25

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D-0079 · 18.11.2026 · O. 20 r. 12

Bharat Bhushan Jain (dead) Thr. Lrs. v. M/s Goodyear India Ltd ., C.A. No.-009668-009669 - 2013

Bench: HON'BLE MR. JUSTICE PRASHANT KUMAR MISHRA, HON'BLE MR. JUSTICE SHREE CHANDRASHEKHAR (2 judges). Judgment by HON'BLE MR. JUSTICE PRASHANT KUMAR MISHRA

Supreme Court upholds High Court's mesne profits rate of Rs. 7 and Rs. 5 per sq ft as fair and evidence-based.

Editorial illustration on Code of Civil Procedure, 1908. Court fixes mesne profits at Rs. 7 and Rs. 5 per sq ft based on evidence.

Facts that mattered

  • The suit premises at Ansari Road, Daryaganj, New Delhi were let to Goodyear India Ltd., with tenancy terminated w.e.f. midnight of 31.12.1989; the decree for possession attained finality in 2001.
  • The Trial Court passed a preliminary decree under Order XX Rule 12 CPC directing separate inquiry into mesne profits, later fixing Rs. 22/sq ft (ground floor) and Rs. 11/sq ft (mezzanine) with 15% interest.
  • The First Appellate Court set aside the Trial Court's rate as speculative, limiting mesne profits to the admitted rent, but overlooked an admission by the tenant's own witness DW-1 about prevailing locality rent of Rs. 5-8 per sq ft.
  • The High Court found this omission a substantial question of law, fixing Rs. 7/sq ft (ground) and Rs. 5/sq ft (mezzanine) with 7.5% simple interest; the Supreme Court dismissed appeals against that determination.

Legal concepts

  • Mesne profits are compensatory in nature, intended to recompense the true owner for loss caused by continued wrongful occupation, and their assessment is not governed by any rigid formula.

    Reaffirmed · para 10 · Martin and Harris Private Limited and Another vs. Rajendra Mehta and Others, (2022) 8 SCC 527, para 10

  • Determination of mesne profits is essentially an appreciation of evidence and does not warrant appellate interference unless manifestly arbitrary, unsupported by the record, or based on erroneous application of law.

    Reaffirmed · para 10 · Martin and Harris Private Limited and Another vs. Rajendra Mehta and Others, (2022) 8 SCC 527, para 10

  • Interest forms an integral component of mesne profits, compensating the owner for deprivation of beneficial enjoyment of the property during wrongful occupation.

    Reaffirmed · para 16

  • Omission by an appellate court to consider a material piece of evidence having direct bearing on mesne profits determination gives rise to a substantial question of law warranting interference.

    Laid down · para 13

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Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996 (1)

D-0076 · 18.11.2026 · ss. 34, 37

M/s Marino Dredgeco Limited v. the Board of Trustees of the Port of Kolkata, C.A. No.-014303-014303 - 2026

Bench: HON'BLE MR. JUSTICE J.B. PARDIWALA, HON'BLE MR. JUSTICE K. VINOD CHANDRAN (2 judges). Judgment by HON'BLE MR. JUSTICE K. VINOD CHANDRAN

Court restores arbitral award, holding shock to conscience cannot justify Section 37 modification

Editorial illustration on Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996. Court restores full award, saying size of claim alone cannot justify modifying it.

Facts that mattered

  • The Port Trust of Kolkata awarded a contract for dredging a channel and basin at Sagar Island; additional work was entrusted due to siltation, force majeure, and mismatch of soil data supplied by the Port Trust.
  • The Arbitrator quantified amounts for the additional work based on measurements and invoices; the Single Judge under Section 34 affirmed the award.
  • The Division Bench under Section 37 modified the award to 50% and reduced interest to 6%, holding that additional work claims exceeding 70% of the original contract shocked the conscience of the Court.
  • The Supreme Court restored the award, finding the modification outside Section 37 jurisdiction since the award was based on adequate evidence and not perverse.

Legal concepts

  • An award cannot be modified under Section 37 merely because the court's conscience is shocked by the size of the claim, absent a substantive reason showing conflict with basic notions of morality or justice.

    Laid down · para 8 · Somdatt Builders–NCC–NEC (JV) v. National Highways Authority of India & Ors., (2025) 6 SCC 757, para 10

  • Parties to arbitration must be treated equally, and no special treatment or adverse inference can be drawn merely because the award debtor is a government entity.

    Reaffirmed · para 13

  • An award may be set aside in part only where the valid and invalid portions are legally and practically separable, not inter-dependent or intrinsically intertwined.

    Reaffirmed · para 11

  • Re-examining measurements and invoices under Section 37 would amount to adjudication on the merits, prohibited under the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996.

    Laid down · para 12

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Land Acquisition and Rehabilitation Acts (1)

D-0081 · 18.11.2026 · s. 34

Bibol Toppo v. State of Odisha, C.A. No.-008294-008294 - 2026

Bench: HON'BLE MR. JUSTICE DIPANKAR DATTA, HON'BLE MR. JUSTICE SATISH CHANDRA SHARMA (2 judges). Judgment by HON'BLE MR. JUSTICE DIPANKAR DATTA

Acquisition set aside for lacking mandatory prior Gram Sabha consent and 80% family consent under 2013 Act

Editorial illustration on Land Acquisition and Rehabilitation Acts. Court set aside land acquisition for missing mandatory prior Gram Sabha and family consent.

Facts that mattered

  • The State of Odisha initiated land acquisition under the 2013 Act for surface rights over land in three villages, at the instance of a private company holding a mining lease.
  • Gram Panchayats unanimously rejected the proposal in January 2020, and no public hearing on the draft SIA was conducted due to Covid-19 restrictions.
  • The Expert Group included a person connected to the company as Advisor, Land Acquisition, and prior consent of 80% affected families was not obtained before Section 8 examination.
  • The High Court dismissed the writ petition, holding consent requirements were directory and the acquisition substantially compliant; the Supreme Court set aside the acquisition.

Legal concepts

  • Prior consent under Section 2(2)(b) must be obtained along with the SIA study and before the government examines the proposal under Section 8, not as a continuing process throughout acquisition proceedings.

    Laid down · para 31

  • The requirement of prior Gram Sabha consent under Section 41(3) for land acquisition in Scheduled Areas is mandatory, not directory, and cannot be negated by the directory language of sub-sections (1) and (2).

    Laid down · para 39

  • The Expert Group evaluating the SIA report must be independent under Section 7(1); including a person connected to the project proponent compromises this statutory independence.

    Laid down · para 46

  • The 2013 Act and the MMDR Act operate in distinct spheres and can be harmoniously construed; a mining lease between State and lessee cannot affect third-party landowners' proprietary rights.

    Laid down · para 49

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Other (1)

D-0083 · 18.11.2026 · s. 29

Power Grid Corporation of India Limited v. Tangedco, C.A. No.-014780-014781 - 2025

Bench: HON'BLE MR. JUSTICE J.B. PARDIWALA, HON'BLE MR. JUSTICE K. VINOD CHANDRAN (2 judges). Judgment by HON'BLE MR. JUSTICE K. VINOD CHANDRAN

Supreme Court restores CERC order, holding LILOs used in transmission and tariff claim sustainable

Editorial illustration on Other. Court restored tariff charges on the generating company for the period its dedicated line was unbuilt.

Facts that mattered

  • PGCIL, the Central Transmission Utility, commissioned two LILOs on the Tuticorin JV-Madurai 400kV line at Tuticorin Pooling Station on 04.01.2015 and 08.01.2015, part of the transmission scheme approved in the 30th Standing Committee Meeting and the Bulk Power Transmission Agreement.
  • The generating company, Coastal Energen (now Moxie Power), delayed constructing its dedicated transmission line to the Tuticorin Pooling Station until 27.10.2016, while upstream lines to Salem and Madhugiri were commissioned only later.
  • CERC accepted the COD and cast transmission charges on the generating company till DTL commissioning; APTEL set this aside, holding the LILOs were not put to beneficial use since upstream lines were not operational.
  • The Supreme Court found power was necessarily diverted through the LILOs to the Pooling Station and restored the CERC order, allowing PGCIL's non-PoC tariff claim for 04.01.2015 to 27.10.2016.

Legal concepts

  • Regulation 4(3)(ii) of the Tariff Regulations applies only where regular service of a transmission element is prevented by delay in commissioning the generating station or the upstream or downstream transmission system, not attributable to the transmission licensee.

    Laid down · para 40

  • COD of a transmission element is the date declared by the transmission licensee after successful trial operation and issue of the RLDC certificate, so no redetermination under Regulation 4(3)(ii) is warranted where regular service was not prevented.

    Reaffirmed · para 41

  • CERC may impose liability on a defaulting party under Section 79(1) even in the absence of a regulation framed under Section 178, provided the levy is reasonable.

    Reaffirmed · para 45 · Energy Watchdog v. Central Electricity Regulatory Commission and Ors. Etc., (2017) 14 SCC 80, para 45

  • Decisions of the Standing Committee taken under Section 29(4) of the Electricity Act in furtherance of grid stability and coordinated transmission planning have legal sanctity and bind all stakeholders.

    Reaffirmed · para 47

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