Prevention of Corruption Act cases: bribery, sanction and trial

Sections 7 to 10 were substituted with effect from 26 July 2018. Section 7 punishes a public servant who obtains, accepts or attempts to obtain an undue advantage to perform a public duty improperly or dishonestly, or as a reward for doing so, with three to seven years and fine. Obtaining or attempting to obtain the advantage is itself an offence, even if the duty was not performed improperly. Section 7A punishes taking an undue advantage to influence a public servant by corrupt means or personal influence.

Section 13 now defines criminal misconduct as misappropriation of entrusted property or intentional illicit enrichment during office. Illicit enrichment is presumed where the public servant, or anyone on his behalf, holds assets disproportionate to known lawful income that he cannot satisfactorily account for. The punishment is four to ten years and fine.

Section 8 punishes giving or promising an undue advantage to induce or reward improper performance of a public duty with up to seven years, or fine, or both. A person compelled to pay is outside the section if he reports it to the investigating agency within seven days, as is a person who pays after informing the agency, to help its investigation.

Under Section 9 a commercial organisation is liable to a fine if a person associated with it, including a presumed employee, bribes a public servant to obtain or retain business. Proof of adequate procedures under prescribed guidelines is a defence. Section 10 makes a director or officer who consented to or connived at the offence liable to three to seven years and fine.

Section 17A bars the police from any enquiry, inquiry or investigation into an offence relatable to a recommendation or decision of a public servant in official duty, without previous approval of the government or authority competent to remove him. No approval is needed for an on-the-spot arrest for accepting an undue advantage. The authority must decide within three months, extendable by one month.

In Tejaram v. State of Rajasthan (2026 INSC 1147), decided on 16 October 2026, the Supreme Court held that Section 17A did not cover an allegation that a constable demanded a bribe, a criminal act unconnected with official functions. In B.S. Yeddiyurappa v. A. Alam Pasha (2025 INSC 515), the Court framed questions on how Section 17A approval relates to a Magistrate's order directing investigation under Section 156(3) of the CrPC (now Section 175 of the BNSS) on a private complaint.

No court can take cognizance of an offence under Sections 7, 11, 13 or 15 against a public servant without previous sanction from the authority competent to remove him, and the Explanation extends this to a person who has ceased to hold that office. A private person can seek sanction only after filing a complaint in court, and the public servant must then be heard. The authority should decide within three months.

Nanjappa v. State of Karnataka ((2015) 14 SCC 186) held that the validity of a sanction can be raised at any stage. If it is invalid, the court can discharge the accused so a fresh sanction may be obtained. On appeal or revision, Section 19(3) bars reversal for an error or irregularity in sanction unless a failure of justice has in fact occurred. Central Bureau of Investigation v. Jagat Ram ([2024] 12 S.C.R. 533) relied on earlier rulings that failure of justice can be shown only after evidence is led, not at the stage of charge.

In Neeraj Dutta v. State (Govt. of NCT of Delhi) ((2023) 4 SCC 731), a Constitution Bench held that the offer or demand must be proved as a fact in issue; mere receipt of money is not an offence under Section 7 or the earlier Section 13(1)(d). Demand may be proved by direct or circumstantial evidence. If the complainant turns hostile, dies or is unavailable, other witnesses or circumstances can prove it, and the trial does not end in acquittal for that reason alone.

Once acceptance of an undue advantage is proved, Section 20 requires the court to presume it was a motive or reward under Section 7. Neeraj Dutta treats this as a mandatory presumption that does not apply to the earlier Section 13(1)(d). In Paritala Sudhakar v. State of Telangana (2025 SCC OnLine SC 1072) the Court set aside a conviction because demand was not proved, holding that the presumption under Section 20 then does not operate against the accused.

Under Section 4 only special judges try these offences, along with any other offence charged at the same trial. Trials should run day to day, with an aim to finish in two years; extensions of up to six months at a time are allowed, ordinarily not beyond four years in all. Section 12 punishes abetment with three to seven years and fine.

Section 18A, inserted in 2018, applies the Criminal Law Amendment Ordinance, 1944 to attachment and confiscation of property procured through an offence, subject to the Prevention of Money Laundering Act, 2002, with the special judge acting in place of the District Judge.

A convicted public servant may seek suspension of sentence under Section 430 of the BNSS (formerly Section 389 of the CrPC). Afjal Ansari v. State of U.P. ([2023] 16 S.C.R. 969) quotes the earlier view that the sentence should normally be suspended when an appeal is admitted, but a conviction on a corruption charge should not.